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Virtue ethics has now well and truly established itself as one of the main normative theories. 
It is now quite common, and indeed, expected, for virtue ethics to be included, alongside 
deontology and consequentialism, in any Moral Philosophy syllabus worth its salt. Students 
are typically introduced to virtue ethics only after studying the other two normative 
theories, and this often sets the scene for various sorts of misunderstandings, with students 
expecting virtue ethics to be based on the same set of rules and assumptions as its rivals. Or 
at least, that is my experience. In this paper I want to focus on one such misunderstanding, 
which arises when trying to apply virtue ethics to our judgments of other people’s actions 
and behaviour. Although there are countless ways in which a theory can be misunderstood, 
it is worth guarding against this one in particular, given that it can lead someone who takes 
virtue ethics seriously to act in ways that are not virtuous, or even vicious.  
I begin by making a few remarks about the role of normative theory, and then go on to give 
four examples of how applying virtue ethics can lead to poor behaviour.  In the final section 
I identify the mistake in question and conclude by noting how it can be avoided. 
 
Normative theory 
Moral philosophers generally agree that normative theory, specifically, its account of right 
action, has two important functions: It is supposed to provide action guidance, that is, it 
should help me answer the question, “What ought I do?”, and it should allow me to assess 
or evaluate actions as either right or wrong, good or bad, justified or unjustified. As William 
Frankena writes:  
The ultimate concern of the normative theory of obligation is to guide us in the 
making of decisions and judgements about actions in particular situations. A main 
concern, of course, is to guide us in our capacity as agents trying to decide what we 
should do in this case and in that. But we want to know more than just what we 
should do in situations before us. We also wish to make judgments about what 
others should do, especially if they ask us about what we or they should have done, 
about whether what we or someone else did was right or wrong, and so on. We are 
not just agents in morality; we are also spectators, advisers, instructors, judges, and 
critics (Frankena 1973: 12). 
In this passage Frankena identifies four tasks uses or functions of a normative theory, 
namely:  
1. first person action guidance (“to guide us in our capacity as agents trying to decide 
what we should do in this case and in that”);  
2. second person action guidance (“to make judgments about what others should do”);  
3. self-directed judgements (“to make judgments about… whether what we… did was 
right or wrong”); and  
4. other-directed judgments (“to make judgments about … whether what … someone 
else did was right or wrong”).  
The question of whether virtue ethics provides adequate action guidance (1. and 2.) has 
been the subject of much debate among both normative theorists and applied ethicists 
(See, e.g. Annas 2004, 2015; Hursthouse 1991, 1999, 2006a, 2007; Gardiner 2003; Walker 
and Ivanhoe 2007). Although I will begin (and end) by making a few comments about acion 
guidance, my focus in this paper, is on other-directed moral judgments. Specifically, the 
question I want to consider is: Does virtue ethics allow us to make better judgments of the 
actions of others? I will use Hursthouse’s qualified-agent account of right action, given that 
it is by far the most familiar one, but much of what I have to say will apply to other accounts 
as well.  
 
Hursthouse on right action 
Hursthouse gives the following criterion of right action:  
An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically … do in the 
circumstances (1999: 28).  
Some critics complain that this is far too vague to provide adequate action guidance – if I am 
less than fully virtuous, how can I possibly figure out what a virtuous person would do my 
situation? Hursthouse responds by noting that the fully virtuous person would do what is 
courageous, just, honest, etc. and would not do what is cowardly, unjust, dishonest, etc. In 
effect, then, virtue ethics offers a long list of action-guiding rules, which she refers to as the 
“v-rules”:  
Not only does each virtue generate a prescription – do what is honest, charitable, 
generous – but each vice a prohibition – do not do what is dishonest, uncharitable, 
mean (1999: 36). 
In a more recent paper, Hursthouse claims that the v-rules provide better action guidance 
than the sorts of rules that deontologists and utilitarians come up with, given that “there 
are so many more and they are so much more specific and subtly nuanced” (2006b: 107). 
Another advantage is that it also focuses our attention on the attitudes and emotions that 
are appropriate in the circumstances. It is not just that I should be generous by giving of my 
time and resources to help others, I should also do so gladly, happy in the knowledge that I 
am able to make a difference to the happiness of others. Hursthouse emphasizes that it is a 
mistake to expect virtue ethics – or any normative theory – to provide a set of rules or “a 
decision procedure which any reasonably clever adolescent could apply” (1999: 18). 
Deciding what to do, or applying the v-rules, requires wisdom and experience.   
 
Other-directed moral judgments 
Applying Hursthouse’s account of right action when judging other people’s actions appears 
to be a fairly straight-forward matter: We should consider whether the agent did what a 
virtuous agent would do in the situation, more specifically, whether he or she acted in a way 
that can be described as kind, courageous, honest, and so forth. Hursthouse gives us an 
example of how one could apply her biconditional in her well-known paper, “Virtue theory 
and abortion” (1991). Her aim in this paper is to demonstrate that virtue ethics can make an 
important – and distinctive – contribution to philosophical discussions about the morality of 
abortion. She argues that the morality of abortion depends on the sort of character a 
woman manifests in her reasons for terminating her pregnancy. Instead of focusing on the 
rights of women or the status of the foetus, the central question, for virtue ethics, is:  
How do [the familiar biological facts about pregnancy, childbirth, and parenthood] 
figure in the practical reasoning, actions and passions, thoughts and reactions, of the 
virtuous and the nonvirtuous? What is the mark of having the right attitude to these 
facts and what manifests having the wrong attitude to them? (1991: 237) 
Many commentators cite Hursthouse’s paper as an example of how virtue ethics can 
provide action guidance. For instance, Justin Oakley (2013: 211) notes that: 
[Hursthouse’s] introduction of virtue and vice terms into contemporary abortion 
debates seemed to better match the concerns and experiences of many women (and 
men) considering whether to terminate a pregnancy. For many women who take 
themselves to have an overriding right to terminate their pregnancies nevertheless 
wonder about the sorts of considerations raised by Hursthouse when they are 
thinking about the moral justifiability of having an abortion in their current 
circumstances.  
 
Insensitivity and intrusiveness 
Hursthouse’s commentators do not specifically address the question of whether thinking in 
terms of virtue and vice allows us to make better judgments of other people’s actions (in 
this case, the act of procuring an abortion). But it is interesting to note that that the strategy 
that Hursthouse employs in this paper is not the one commonly used by applied ethicists, 
which is to present a moral dilemma and then to pose the question, “What should the agent 
do in these circumstances?” Instead, she presents a number of different circumstances in 
which a woman has had an abortion, and then considers whether they acted virtuously or 
viciously in doing so: 
Consider, for instance, a woman who has already had several children and fears that 
to have another will seriously affect her capacity to be a good mother to the ones 
she has – she does not show lack of appreciation of the intrinsic value of being a 
parent by opting for abortion…. Nor, necessarily, does a woman who has decided to 
lead a life centered around some other worthwhile activity or activities with which 
motherhood would compete (1991: 241-2). 
In this passage Hursthouse is clearly involved in the business of judging others’ actions, and 
so it seems reasonable for us to follow the same kind of approach when judging other 
people’s actions. Consider the case where my good friend Mary, a happily married mother 
of two, confides in me that she recently had an abortion because, she says, she simply could 
not cope with another baby. How am I to judge her act of procuring an abortion?  
If I applied a deontological account of right action I might reason as follows: Mary (and 
everyone else, for that matter) has a duty not to kill an innocent person. The fetus is (or is 
not) a person, and so procuring an abortion is (or is not) wrong. Applying a rights-based 
approach, in turn, might have me reason that Mary (and everyone else) has a right to bodily 
integrity, which includes (or does not include) a right to have an abortion, and so Mary’s 
action was (or was not) permissible. The thing to note about these judgments is that they 
are entirely impersonal – I need not know anything about Mary (other than the fact that she 
had an abortion) in order to make a judgment. Virtue ethics, by contrast, takes the agent’s 
inner states – reasons, feelings, attitudes, and motives – as morally relevant. It is generally 
thought to be one of the advantages of virtue ethics that it judges actions, not merely as 
right or wrong, but in terms of “thicker” concepts, such as compassionate, generous, brave, 
selfish, cruel, and so on. These concepts are both evaluative and descriptive, and allow us to 
make judgments that are more nuanced and personal.  
However, this very same feature of virtue ethics appears to be a disadvantage when it 
comes to applying the theory to our judgments of others. I encounter two closely related 
problems when trying to judge Mary’s actions. The first is that an epistemic problem: I don’t 
know why Mary thinks she cannot cope with another baby. It could be that she would have 
to cut down on luxuries, or spend less time socialising, in which case her actions are selfish, 
shallow, and grossly materialistic, as Hursthouse (1991: 241) puts it. Alternatively, she might 
have a very good reason, involving financial problems, mental illness, or the like, in which 
case the decision to have an abortion could well be the mature or responsible thing to do. 
As to Mary’s attitude, her rather nonchalant demeanour might well be a sign that she’s not 
taking the matter seriously at all, or it could be a mask she is wearing to enable her to cope 
with her decision. In short, if a virtuous action is one that involves acting for the right 
reasons, with the right emotions and attitudes, then I will very seldom have the information 
I need in order to make an accurate judgement.  
At this point one might argue that our frequent lack of knowledge of people’s true motives 
and attitudes merely presents us with a practical problem, one that other normative 
theories encounter as well and that we should simply deal with as best we can. However, 
when we consider what is involved in dealing with the epistemic problem as best we can, a 
further difficulty emerges. Making an accurate judgment seems to require closer scrutiny of 
people, with the aim of revealing their true motives, feelings, and attitudes. What I should 
do, it seems, is to question Mary about her reasons for having an abortion. Why exactly 
does she feel she cannot cope with another baby? I might also look at her life style and 
general behaviour for clues as to whether she is shallow or grossly materialistic, and so on. 
However, I take it as obvious that this kind of scrutiny would be inappropriate – insensitive 
and intrusive. A good person who finds herself in my circumstances would not scrutinize and 
judge her friend but would offer comfort and support, and trust that she had a good reason 
for seeking an abortion. By applying virtue ethics when judging others, it appears, I run the 
risk of acting viciously myself.  
 
Meanness and uncharitability  
Applying virtue ethics to our judgments of others can also result in actions (or acts of 
judgment) that are mean and uncharitable. Consider the following example: A family is 
sitting around the table, having just finished their dinner, when the teenage boy thanks his 
mother politely and volunteers to do the dishes. The first thought that crosses her mind is, 
“What a lovely boy, always so kind and considerate.” However, having just studied virtue 
ethics in an online Moral Philosophy course, she wonders whether her judgment is correct: 
“Did he truly do what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances? On the face of it, it 
would seem so. He offered to help, instead of complaining about the meal or rushing off to 
play video games, as so many teenagers do. But did he act from virtue? It could well be that 
he truly appreciates the efforts I made with dinner and that he really wants to make a 
contribution, and that the behaviour I am witnessing is a manifestation of true virtue (or at 
least virtue in progress). But it could also be that he is trying to manipulate me, and that he 
is acting selfishly and therefore wrongly. Then again, it could be that his behaviour is neither 
a manifestation of virtue nor of vice, but simply the result of a good upbringing: I have 
taught him to thank people and to be helpful, and that’s what he is in the habit of doing.” 
She decides to withhold her praise until she’s discovered his true motives, and begins to 
watch her son more closely, looking for patterns of behaviour: Does he only offer to help 
when he expects to get something in return? Does he offer to help even when the task at 
hand is very unpleasant? Is he sincerely grateful or is he just in the habit of thanking 
people?, and so on. 
Here, as in the abortion case, we encounter the problem of intrusiveness: Making an 
accurate judgment of her son’s actions requires an inappropriate level of scrutiny of his 
behaviour over an extended period of time. But the case also demonstrates a further 
problem. By withholding praise and doubting whether her son’s actions are truly kind and 
considerate, she herself is guilty of being mean and uncharitable. Unless he has given her 
good reason to suspect that he is selfish and manipulative, a good mother would respond to 
her son’s offer by saying something like, “That’s very kind of you,” without subjecting this 
thought – and her son – to further critical scrutiny. More generally, she will be charitable in 
her judgments of others, giving them the benefit of the doubt, and not be too worried about 
whether she has sufficient evidence to support her judgements. This is not to say that it is 
never appropriate to scrutinize other people’s behaviour in an attempt to figure out 
whether they and reliable and sincere. Rather, the point is simply that by being overly 
concerned with making correct judgments of other people’s behaviour and character, we 
risk becoming mean and judgmental ourselves.  
 
Nit-picking and hypocrisy 
Another way in which we can act poorly when applying virtue ethics to our judgments of 
others is a result of the perfectionism inherent in many forms of virtue ethics. Virtues are 
ideals, or human excellences, and as such, we will hardly ever find instances of true virtue in 
action. Accordingly, if we judge others’ actions in terms of virtue-and vice terms, our 
judgments will often be very harsh and hypocritical. Consider, for example, the recent case 
of David Pugh, a 55-year old man from West Midlands who fought off five machete-wielding 
intruders with his bare hands. According to news reports, the intruders stormed his house in 
the middle of the night, demanded cash and attacked Pugh’s teenage son. Pugh used 
martial arts to fight them off. He and his son received various injuries, and his house was 
trashed, but the intruders eventually left empty-handed.1  
Most people would describe Pugh’s actions as truly brave or courageous, as indeed the 
news reports do. However, if we are serious about applying virtue ethics, it seems, we will 
have to rethink this claim. Is Pugh’s actions an example of how a truly courageous person 
behaves? Here we might turn to Aristotle’s discussion of “five kinds of courage improperly 
so called” in Book III.8 of The Nicomachean Ethics. For example, considering Pugh’s training 
in martial arts and his claim that “instinct took over,” we might wonder whether he 
displayed what Aristotle refers to as mere “optimism” or “sanguinity:” confidence in danger 
only because he has “conquered often and against many foes” and because he thinks he is 
“the strongest and can suffer nothing.” Or we might suspect that he acted from anger or 
passion rather than choosing this course of action “because it is noble to do so, or because it 
is disgraceful not to do so.” Finally, if Pugh had the option of appeasing the intruders by 
handing over cash or other valuables, then choosing to fight them off would have been 
extremely foolish. 
                                                          
1 http://metro.co.uk/2018/02/14/dad-dog-hacked-fighting-off-machete-armed-robbers-break-7312973/ 
 
Virtue ethicists (and virtue theorists, more generally) disagree about the nature of true 
courage, and so it is not uncommon – or inappropriate – for them to discuss the above kinds 
of question in the context of an academic debate. However, in the context of everyday life 
and when judging other people’s behaviour, engaging is such discussions will often be 
inappropriate. Imagine, for example, that Pugh’s friend, Gerhard, responds to others’ 
comments about his bravery by saying something like: “Well, actually, his actions were not 
truly courageous because, as Aristotle says….” The problem here is not necessarily that 
Gerhard’s judgment is incorrect. Rather, the problem is that he is being too harsh. Given 
that true courage, however it is defined, is rare, using it as a standard whereby to judge 
others will have the implication that our judgments will almost always be negative, and 
focused on how they fall short. A further, and related, problem is that Gerhard’s judgment is 
almost certainly hypocritical, given that he would in all likelihood not have fared any better 
under the circumstances. 
 
Unfairness and harm 
Some of the risks discussed in the previous sections can be avoided (or mitigated to some 
extent) by noting a point that Hursthouse makes in a more recent paper (2006b). Here she 
argues that applying her biconditional does not necessarily require knowledge of other 
people’s motives or inner states. In many contexts when we consider whether someone did 
what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances, it is appropriate to employ a thin 
notion of “what is done,” one that does not include reference to the agent’s inner states. 
She writes:  
We have … a strong interest in people doing what is honest, just, generous, 
charitable, or benevolent, etc.; to a large extent that’s what keeps society ticking 
over and enables us to live together fairly pleasantly, and that – or those – purposes 
are served tolerably well even when a lot of people are doing what is right for the 
wrong reasons – out of fear of disapproval or the law, or because it suits them better 
than doing otherwise, or to curry favor or whatever (Hursthouse 2006b: 108-109). 
In these contexts, we can evaluate an action as right (kind, generous, honest, etc.) without 
first having to discover the agent’s true motives. We might claim that Kant’s shopkeeper 
performed a right or honest action by giving a customer the correct change irrespective of 
his actual motives. However, Hursthouse goes on to argue that there are contexts in which 
it is appropriate to use a more demanding standard, one that includes a consideration of the 
agent’s motives, feelings and attitudes. She writes:  
Thinking of the virtuous agent as the one who sets the standard to which we should 
all aspire, we get a richer notion of “what is done.” What you do does not count as 
right unless it is what the virtuous agent would do, say, “tell the truth, after much 
painful thought, for the right reasons, feeling deep regret, having put in place all that 
can be done to support the person on the receiving end afterwards.” Only if you get 
all of that right are you entitled to the satisfactory review of your own conduct... 
[S]imply making the right decision and telling the truth is not good enough to merit 
approval (2006b: 109). 
It is interesting to note that Hursthouse is talking about the evaluations we make of our own 
behaviour (self-directed judgments) in this passage. Although we can certainly be 
overcritical of our own behaviour, many of the problems – to do with intrusiveness, 
hypocrisy, and meanness – do not arise in this context. I know very well that I was 
motivated purely by malice when I told the truth about C, and so I cannot feel satisfied 
about my conduct – I can and should aim to do better. And if I am unsure about my true 
motives, then some introspection or self-scrutiny is entirely appropriate for it aids me in my 
attempt to become a better person. Interestingly, however, the example that Hursthouse 
uses to illustrate her claim that it is sometimes appropriate to use a more demanding 
standard, is of an other-directed judgment: 
There I was, confident in assessing the plain-speaking of a colleague in a meeting as 
right, because honest – just the kind of straightforwardness we need in order to 
come to mutual decisions effectively and enable the department to run. And then I 
discover that the truth-teller is in fact usually evasive, manipulative, and plain 
mendacious in such meetings, and that his truth-telling on this occasion was 
motivated purely by spite, and I reassess it. “The ratbag!” I say. “What a rotten thing 
to do, to say that just to upset so and so.” And if you press me on whether his action 
wasn’t, all the same, right in some way, because honest, I shall say (a) that it would 
have been right, because honest, coming from, for example, John, but (b) that it 
wasn’t honest coming from him and he would have done better to hold his tongue 
(2006b: 109).  
Hursthouse concludes this passage by noting that “my biconditional works” – presumably, 
she means by this that it allows us to make accurate judgments. And so it seems reasonable 
to see it as an example of how we should apply virtue ethics when judging others. However, 
if we try to follow her lead in this regard, we soon run into trouble. To illustrate, imagine 
overhearing the following exchange: 
Jack: When I first joined the department I thought Paula was very helpful, giving me 
just the kind of information I needed to settle in. But then I discovered that she’s in 
fact selfish and manipulative, and was only being helpful because she needed my 
vote at the Board meeting. What a ratbag! Such a rotten thing to do, trying to help 
me just to use me! 
Alice: But how do you know she’s selfish and manipulative? What if she’s really just 
trying to be helpful?  
Jack: Oh, I’m very sure. I talked to a couple of people who know her well, and they 
both say the same thing. She has quite the reputation around the faculty. And I’ve 
seen it with my own eyes: she’s only ever helpful when there’s something in it for 
her. So just watch out, you cannot trust her.  
Jack is focused on making a judgment of Paula’s actions, but in the course of doing so he is 
acting rather deplorably himself. Whereas Hursthouse stipulates that the plain-speaking 
colleague is “in fact usually evasive, manipulative, and plain mendacious in such meetings,” 
Jack cannot be certain that Paula is in fact selfish and manipulative. He could well be 
mistaken, and the mistake in question is not merely theoretical. Rather, it is one that can 
have a significant impact on Paula and her relationships with co-workers. By making – and 
sharing – an inaccurate judgment of Paula he will be guilty of treating her unfairly and quite 
possibly harming her. But even if he is not mistaken, Alice might feel uneasy about the 
amount of time and effort Jack has devoted in pursuit of making an accurate judgment of 
Paula’s actions and character. Shouldn’t he focus more of his attention on improving his 
own actions and character and less on judging the behaviour of others? 
 
Good (virtuous) judgment 
These examples of vicious judgment point to a tension between Moral Philosophy and 
moral practice. As philosophers interested in questions about virtue and right action, we are 
concerned with making judgments that are accurate. We want to know, for example, what 
true courage or generosity consists in. We want to know when it is true to claim, for 
example, that having an abortion is self-indulgent, callous, and irresponsible. We get to 
judge the actions of hypothetical agents, and we are given all the relevant facts (or we just 
make them up as we go). We don’t have to worry about being unfair, unkind, judgmental, or 
hypocritical.  
However, as agents trying to live virtuously, we don’t have the omniscience of the moral 
philosopher. We usually don’t have the relevant facts – about other people’s motives, 
attitudes and circumstances – that are needed for making accurate judgements. And the 
attempt to obtain this information will often require an inappropriate amount of scrutiny 
and interference in other people’s lives. We are not, as Frankena (1973: 12) puts it, mere 
spectators, judges, or critics, sitting at a distance from those we judge. We are judging 
people with whom we stand in some kind of relationship, and our acts of judgement can 
affect them: they can be unkind, judgmental, hypocritical, or uncalled-for, even while being 
accurate. Whereas the philosopher is concerned with making accurate judgements, this 
cannot be our goal in everyday encounters with others. And so it appears that we should 
not use a virtue-ethical criterion of right action when judging others.  
The discovery of this tension might lead one to conclude that virtue ethics is self-
undermining. A normative theory is supposed to allow us to make better judgments of other 
people’s actions, and yet by applying its criterion of right action we risk acting viciously 
ourselves. Something has clearly gone wrong, but what? 
To see what has gone wrong in the application of virtue ethics we need to reconsider our 
assumptions about the role of normative theory. Consequentialists and deontologists share 
the assumption that the central task of normative theory is to answer the philosophical 
question, “What makes an action right?” The criterion of right action can then be applied to 
particular cases. As we’ve seen, Frankena claims that it has four more specific functions, 
which is to help me: (1) decide what I should do in my present situation, (2) advise others 
about what they should do in their situation, (3) make an accurate judgment of the 
rightness of my own actions, and (4) make an accurate judgment of the rightness of other 
people’s actions (See Frankena 1973: 12). None of these functions have priority over the 
others. They are just the different things one can do with an account of right action, 
depending on whether one is occupying the role of agent, adviser, judge, or critic. In each 
case, the criterion allows us to distinguish, from an impersonal point of view, actions that 
are right from actions that are wrong. If the theory shows that action X is wrong in 
circumstances C (because it is contrary to duty, for example, or because it fails to maximise 
utility), then applying this assessment to everyday cases would render the judgement that 
(1) I ought not to do X in C; (2) Y ought not to do X in C, (3) I acted wrongly by doing X in C, 
and (4) Y acted wrongly by doing X in C. In this sense, there are no interesting differences 
between these four judgments.  
However, if we expect virtue ethics to produce a criterion of right action that can then be 
applied, from an impersonal point of view, when making moral decisions and judging others 
we run into trouble. Figuring out what a virtuous person would do in my situation is a very 
different business from judging whether someone else succeeded in acting virtuously. 
Consider, for example, a situation where it is clear that a virtuous person would be kind to a 
vulnerable woman. When I am the one finding myself in this situation, figuring out how to 
act kindly requires reflection of a very personal nature: I have to be careful not to raise my 
voice, in the way that I so often do, and not to dismiss her concerns as trivial. I might have 
to check, before I get involved in her affairs, that I am not driven merely by curiosity but that 
I truly care about her, and so on. Assuming that there is time for this, reflecting on the 
personal – my motives, thoughts and feelings, and my flaws and weaknesses – is entirely 
appropriate when I am deciding how to act. (Of course, if I were a fully virtuous person such 
reflection would be unnecessary, but alas, I am not.) By contrast, when the task at hand is 
making an accurate judgement of someone else’s actions, of whether he succeeded in 
acting virtuously, we encounter the problems discussed above, leading us to conclude that 
when judging others, we should not apply a virtue-ethical criterion of right action.  
We can avoid the problem by noting that virtue ethics – at least in the eudaimonist tradition 
– does not begin with an abstract philosophical question, “What makes an action right?” 
Instead, it begins with a question that is both practical and deeply personal, namely: “How 
should I live?” (or “What kind of person should I become?”). Unlike the question of what 
makes an action right, the question of how one should live is one that concerns each one of 
us insofar as we have an interest in living well. As Aristotle notes: “[W]e are inquiring not in 
order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good” (NE 1103b27-8). Aristotle is not 
engaged in an abstract philosophical pursuit (such as discovering the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a trait being a virtue, or for an action being right). Instead, he is 
concerned with the question, “How should I, Aristotle, live?” and he is writing for people 
who are grappling with the very same question. What motivates virtue ethics, then, is the 
need for guidance on how to live. As Julia Annas puts it, “the entry point for ethical 
reflection [is] thought about my life as a whole and where it is going” (1993: 33). 
If we consider the function of a virtue-ethical account of right action against this 
background, we see that it is a mistake to assume that (1) deciding what I should do, (2) 
advising others about what they should do, (3) judging my actions, and (4) judging other 
people’s actions, are just the different things I can do with such an account. Instead, the 
primary concern of virtue ethics – and hence its account of right action – is to guide the 
individual in his or her quest to live well. It is in the course of figuring out how to live 
virtuously that the individual encounters the more specific question, “How should I judge 
others?” To interpret this question as a call for a philosophical account of right action, one 
that can be applied in particular situations to render judgements that are correct or 
accurate, would be a mistake.  Rather, the person who poses this question is seeking action 
guidance: she wants to know how to judge well or virtuously.  
The key, then, is to notice that the virtuous person’s primary concern when judging others is 
not to judge accurately but to judge virtuously. Of course, the virtuous judge will be 
concerned with the truth, with determining whether someone is deserving of praise or 
blame. Fairness is an important virtue when judging others. But it is not the only virtue that 
is relevant in this context. A virtuous judge will also be careful to respect others’ privacy, 
and not to subject them to unnecessary or unwarranted scrutiny. She will avoid being 
judgmental, but will also avoid the vice of nonjudgmentalism.2 She will know when it is 
appropriate to be kind and charitable in her judgments. When someone behaves in a way 
that is consistent with virtue, she will tend to assume that they are well-motivated, and be 
quick to praise them for their kindness or their courage. And when a good person acts in 
ways that are consistent with vice, she will be compassionate and forgiving, and will tend to 
assume that they weren’t poorly motivated but made a mistake, or acted out of character. 
At other times, however, when someone behaves in ways that are obviously or undeniably 
vicious, she will be honest and courageous in voicing her disapproval. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Andrei Zavaliy (2016) argues, in this regard, that consistent nonjudgmentalism, that is, “a refusal to voice 
moral disapproval of the behaviour of wrongdoers” is not a virtue, because it involves treating morality as 
optional.  
Conclusion 
The problem of vicious judgment can be avoided by noticing that for virtue ethics, the 
question of how I should judge others is just one of a host of more specific moral questions 
that the individual encounters in the course of answering the more general question, “How 
should I live?” In this sense, the individual is always an agent and never merely a spectator, 
judge, or critic. He sometimes (perhaps often) acts as judge or critic, and the challenge is to 
figure out how to do this well – virtuously – if at all. When judging others, he should 
remember that he is the one deciding and acting; it is his virtue that is at stake. 
As noted earlier, Hursthouse argues that it is unreasonable, given the complexity of moral 
life, to expect a normative theory to provide a “decision procedure” that any clever 
adolescent could apply when deciding how to act. We can now make a similar point with 
regards to other-directed moral judgments, namely that it is unreasonable to expect a 
normative theory to provide a tool or procedure that any clever adolescent could apply 
when judging other people’s actions. Judging well is a complex matter. It involves knowing 
how to apply virtue and vice terms to other people’s actions, and it involves doing so 
virtuously – fairly, charitably, generously, and so on.   
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